The Shadow President: Why Milorad Dodik is Far from Finished

The resignation of President Milorad Dodik and increasing voter fatigue have recently been setbacks for the secessionist forces in the Republika Srpska. However, shifting international alignments could ultimately allow Dodik to succeed. The October 2026 elections will therefore be pivotal for the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In September 2025, long-standing Bosnian Serb political leader Milorad Dodik officially resigned from his presidential position in Republika Srpska (RS), having resisted rulings by the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina against him for noncompliance with, and violations of, the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), the country’s founding document. These legal proceedings were initiated due to Dodik’s disobedience of the Constitutional Court and the Office of the High Representative (OHR). While this brought great relief to Dodik’s opponents, it does not necessarily rule out the secessionist plans of the Bosnian Serb mainstream. Seven months after Dodik’s resignation, the head of the OHR, Christian Schmidt, suddenly announced his departure from office. Schmidt was known for being a strong opponent of the RS’s secessionist policies. This blog post will explore recent events in the RS, Dodik’s secessionist ambitions and his subsequent removal from office. It will also argue that Dodik might not be the real loser of this political struggle in the long run, given these simultaneous developments.

A fragmented and complex structure

The 30-year-old Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) brought the Bosnian War to an end, establishing a fragmented and complex state structure for Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs in Bosnia. The country is split into the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where most residents are Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats, and Republika Srpska, where Bosnian Serbs are the majority. It was territorial and ethnic disputes that drove the brutal war in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995. Although peace now prevails, many citizens are still concerned that nationalist and secessionist discourse could endanger the fragile situation.¹ The view that Bosnia is a failed state remains strong among Bosnian Serb politicians, especially Dodik.

Dodik is known for his secessionist policies. He strongly opposes the OHR and its decisions, despite the OHR having supreme authority to ensure the proper implementation of the DPA. On 5 March 2025, he signed several laws that hinder the operational activities of federal judicial and investigative bodies in the Republika Srpska (RS). However, the Constitutional Court annulled these laws, and Dodik stated that they would remain in force.² In addition to his exclusion from office, he was sentenced to a year in prison but avoided this by paying a fine.

Reports on backdoor negotiations

Despite rejecting the decisions against him, Dodik did not persist in his denial and opposition for long. It is argued that the United States intervened through backdoor negotiations to convince him to step down and abolish secessionist laws. In return, the US would lift sanctions imposed on him, his family, and his network for prior secessionist initiatives and corrupt activities.³ Schmidt’s departure from the OHR and Dodik’s approval of the US-backed gas pipeline project in Bosnia are likely linked to his deals with US officials.

Following Dodik’s resignation, Bosnia’s Central Election Commission called for an early election in the RS to fill the presidential seat he left behind. In October 2025, an interim president replaced him, while Dodik nominated a candidate, Sinisa Karan, for the November 2025 elections. This candidate is expected to serve as caretaker until 2026.   Karan won after a tight race with low turnout and election irregularities, receiving just 35% of the vote.⁴ Although the RS elected a new president, Dodik remained very active during the election campaign for his candidate and repeatedly signalled he would remain a political force in the RS. He claimed that, following his party’s victory, the RS would effectively have “two Dodiks”.⁵ Over the past seven months, he has kept his promise through frequent public appearances.

The low turnout may indicate that voters are tired of Dodik’s personality cult in Bosnian politics. Dodik attempted to legitimise the low turnout by claiming that the majority of people in the RS opposed the election and boycotted it.⁶ The election campaign took place in a highly polarised environment. Dodik called Bosniaks “amoebas” and said the East Sarajevo authorities should not have allowed Bosniaks to move into RS because they could change the election outcomes.⁷ According to a 2014 population census, Bosniaks make up 13,2% of the RS’s population.⁸ After this speech, Dodik was fined 15,000 euros for hate speech.⁹

Profits over peace?

Dodik was the most active political figure during the campaign. He tried to mobilise voters by meeting citizens at events and rallies across the RS. However, this suggests that he failed to reach a significant number of his supporters. The decline in election participation in the RS may be a sign of voter fatigue. Dodik’s inability to bring his voters to the polls is evidence of this. The October 2026 elections will play a significant role in determining the country’s future. The outcome will depend on global actors and developments, such as the agendas of the US and EU in the Western Balkans, and Russia’s war against Ukraine.

It is vital that the international community commits not to countenance the RS’s secessionist attitudes, in order to reduce the corrosive influence of ethno-nationalist discourse. Otherwise, people in Bosnia and Herzegovina will have to endure a vicious cycle of political discourse driven by Dodik’s polarising rhetoric that supports secessionist plans. Schmidt’s resignation under US pressure suggests that the US’s stance towards Dodik has softened, despite his continued public presence and antagonistic rhetoric. However, if the interests of the US and RS leadership converge further, economic benefits may be prioritised over peace dynamics. While legal barriers to Dodik’s direct political involvement may help to reduce ethnic tensions, his polarising, nationalist and populist discourse, coupled with his intention to remain active in politics as party leader — a position he has held since 2006 — could still threaten peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

About the author:
Ahmet Ilhan Kaplan is a master’s degree student at the University of Jena in the International Organisation and Crisis Management program. He worked at the Leibniz Institute for East and Southeast European Studies (IOS) as an intern for the Department of Politics. His interests lie on Southeast European Politics, ethnic conflicts, nationalism, secessionism and irredentism. He is writing his master’s thesis on the interaction between Serbia as a kin-state and Serb populations as co-nationals in Bosnia and Kosovo to detect how irredentist attitudes evolve.

1. Hebib, Aida Trepanic. “‘Worst-Case Scenario’: Fears Grow Among Post-War Returnees in Bosnia”. BalkanInsight, May 27, 2025. https://balkaninsight.com/2025/05/27/worst-case-scenario-fears-grow-among-post-war-returnees-in-bosnia/ [↩]
2. RadioFreeEurope. “Bosnian Prosecutor’s Office Issues Arrest Warrant For Nationalist Leader Dodik”. RadioFreeEurope, March 12, 2025. https://www.rferl.org/a/bosnia-republika-srpska-arrest-warrant-dodik-constitution-russia/33345135.html)) After judicial proceedings, the Bosnian Constitutional Court barred Dodik from all political activities in public office for the next six years. ((Reuters. “Bosnia’s Top Court Confirms Political Ban on Former Bosnian Serb Leader”. Reuters, November 4, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/bosnias-top-court-confirms-political-ban-former-bosnian-serb-leader-2025-11-04/ [↩]
3. TimeBalkan. “Ayrılıkçı Sırp lider Dodik, Bosna Hersek Siyasetindeki Etkisini Kaybediyor”. (interview with Mustafa Krupalija). TimeBalkan, November 5, 2025. https://timebalkan.com/ayrilikci-sirp-lider-dodik-bosna-hersek-siyasetindeki-etkisini-kaybediyor/ [↩]
4. Azem, Kurtic. “Bosnian Serb Presidential Poll Win for Dodik’s Ally Disputed by Opposition”. Balkan Insight, November 24, 2025. https://balkaninsight.com/2025/11/24/bosnian-serb-presidential-poll-win-for-dodiks-ally-disputed-by-opposition/ [↩]
5. European Western Balkans. “Dodik’s Party Candidate Narrowly Wins Snap Presidential Election in Republika Srpska”. European Western Balkans, November 24, 2025. https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2025/11/24/dodiks-party-candidate-narrowly-wins-snap-presidential-election-in-republika-srpska/#:~:text=Dodik’s%20party%20candidate%20narrowly%20wins,;%20Photo:%20X%20/%20@MiloradDodik [↩]
6. European Western Balkans. “Dodik’s Party Candidate Narrowly Wins Snap Presidential Election in Republika Srpska”. European Western Balkans, November 24, 2025. https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2025/11/24/dodiks-party-candidate-narrowly-wins-snap-presidential-election-in-republika-srpska/#:~:text=Dodik’s%20party%20candidate%20narrowly%20wins,;%20Photo:%20X%20/%20@MiloradDodik [↩]
7. Kurtic, Azem. “Bosnian Serbs Head to Polls to Choose New President After Toxic Campaign”. BalkanInsight, November 21, 2025. https://balkaninsight.com/2025/11/21/bosnian-serbs-head-to-polls-to-choose-new-president-after-toxic-campaign/ [↩]
8. Vreme. “The Result of the Census in Bosnia and Herzegovina”. Vreme. November 9, 2025. https://vreme.com/en/projekat/rezultat-popisa-u-bih/ [↩]
9. Latal, Srecko. “’Definitively Punished’: Bosnian Serb Strongman Shaken by Narrow Election Win”. Balkan Insight, November 25, 2025. https://balkaninsight.com/2025/11/25/definitively-punished-bosnian-serb-strongman-shaken-by-narrow-election-win/?nocache [↩]

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