Can Memory Europeanize Us? The EU Memory Framework and Contested Memories of the Yugoslav Wars in Contemporary Serbia

By Nikola Gajić

The EU memory framework is designed as a tool for integrating new member states. However, the discrepancy between the Serbian official memory politics and the EU commemorative practices regarding the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s– in particular the Srebrenica genocide–remains high. This endangers the regional reconciliation process and the country’s Europeanization process.

After World War II, Europe was divided and in turmoil, but there was also a desire for greater international cooperation to prevent future disasters. Out of this desire, the European Community for Coal and Steel was formed, bringing together countries that were working towards economic recovery and starting to establish some political connections.As decades passed, it expanded and deepened its integrative capacities, finally transforming into the European Union (EU). Besides achieving a high level of political cooperation, the EU developed a transnational community of collective remembrance. This transnational memory framework strengthens cohesion among EU member states while also reminding societies of their past sins and omissions. Due to its integrative nature, the EU uses this deliberately constructed memory framework as a tool for integrating new member states.¹ The framework serves two purposes: it imposes the EU’s memory perceptions on candidate countries while also incorporating their national memories into a shared pool of memories. However, this memory exchange has limits, and the power relations during the integration period do not remain static. This means that a candidate country’s official memory must comply with the EU framework to become part of its memory landscape. The integration process highlights the power imbalance, as the candidate country’s subordinated position requires compliance with the norms and values embedded in the EU’s laws, institutions, and memory framework.²

To decode the process of mnemonic interaction between the national and transnational entities, we must not forget the highly debated concept of collective memory.³ Out of the many approaches to the concept, the most relevant ones are the cultural and political types of collective memory.⁴ Even though both are highly pertinent for creating collective cohesion within national spheres, this text predominantly focuses on the latter as it illustrates the role memory plays in ideology formation and the construction of collective identities, both of which are present in the Europeanization process.⁵

The process of Europeanization is multifaceted and usually framed as the legal and institutional integration of candidate countries. However, it also implies that a country must undergo normative and inevitable changes to become a member of the Union. In addition to adopting the EU legal framework, the process initiates normative social transformations that result in changes to its social, political, and cultural norms.⁶ The Normative Power of the EU theory supports this claim, stating that Europeanization, alongside shaping legal norms, shapes the preferences, behaviours, and identities of a particular society.⁷ This occurs as the EU promotes its foundational values, such as democracy, antifascism, the Rule of Law, and sustainable development through its legal norms and common memory framework. Enforcing a specific method of remembering certain events during the integration/Europeanization process reinforces the selected social values that are ingrained within it.

Consequently, by accepting commemorative practice, societies also accept these values, which reconfigure collective identities and make them compatible and non-contested for future political coexistence. This text specifically focuses on the Europeanization of memory as a complementary part of the process. There are two key aspects to the process: spreading questionably framed ‘European values’ through the memory framework while adding a transnational dimension by incorporating relevant parts of national memory.⁸

To observe the questionable success and emerging problems of this process, the text sheds light on the Europeanization of memory in Serbia regarding the wars of the 1990s. It focuses on these tragic events as they are a highly disputed and contested parts of recent Serbian history and its official memory politics. The discrepancy between the Serbian official memory politics and the EU commemorative practices regarding these events jeopardizes the country’s process of joining the EU. The denial of the Srebrenica genocide in Serbian official memory politics, contrasted with the EU commemorative practice regarding the same event, exemplifies the paradoxical nature of the mnemonic interaction between Serbia and the EU.

Could Denial be Europeanized?

On July 11, 1995, the Army of Republika Srpska committed genocide in Srebrenica, killing approximately 8,000 predominantly male civilians. Both the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) legally characterized this war crime as genocide. Recognized as one of the most terrible war crimes in Europe since WWII, the genocide in Srebrenica became part of the EU memory framework. This resulted in two European Parliament Declarations on Srebrenica (2005, 2009) and an official EU commemoration on the 20th anniversary of the genocide (2015).⁹ Because the official commemorative practice was established by EU institutions based on these declarations, it is evident that both current and future member states are required to adhere to these decisions. However, since the beginning of the European integration and Europeanization of society, Serbian officials have resisted addressing the issue. To secure ontological continuity from the 1990s, state officials still acknowledge, glorify, and protect those who committed the war crimes under the Serbian national flag, and lastly, deny their crimes. Therefore, the denial of the genocide in Srebrenica stems from the urge of the same old nationalist political elite from the 1990s to avoid facing collective responsibility while nurturing the same nationalistic matrix that continually keeps society under threat and often secures political points during times of social rupture.

A notable shift in Serbian official memory politics, characterized by explicit and more frequent denial of the Srebrenica genocide, happened after 2012. The comeback of the old nationalistic political elite active of the 1990s, now with more pro-European stances, created an atmosphere of threat associated with the “Western” accusation that allegedly nationalizes the war crime in Srebrenica, thus collectivizing accountability. A perfect example depicting the importance of this war event for the nationalistic political elite, which marked the regime change, came with the inaugural speech by former President Tomislav Nikolić. In this speech, he stated: “There was no genocide in Srebrenica. There was a great crime in Srebrenica committed by some members of the Serbian people who should be found, brought to court, and punished.”¹⁰ The broader public might think that, at that time, the newly elected president is ignorant about international legal norms and the decisions of the ICJ and ICTY. However, this scenario is unlikely because in 2012, the former president initiated a trend of denial that many political actors from the same ideological spectrum still rely on today.

A complementary but slightly different discursive pattern can be found in the statements of the former Prime Minister (PM) and current President Aleksandar Vučić. His actions and statements during his PM mandate (2014–2017) were not different from his presidential era. During the same year he started his long-lasting reign (2017), Vučić stated that terrible crimes in Srebrenica did indeed happen, but the main problem lies in the legal definition of this crime.¹¹ Furthermore, when addressing the issue Vučić added that Serbs learned a lot from these atrocities but also from crimes such as those that happened in Bratunac, during “Operation Storm”, and in the Jasenovac concentration camp.¹² By emphasizing reciprocity in victimhood and reminding the public of crimes committed against Serbs, he tried to shift the victim-perpetrator rhetoric and continue with the overly present self-victimizing narrative. His discourse remained the same in 2022, as he claimed: “Because someone does not want to feel reverence from us, does not want to see respect for the victims, but wants to frame a legal formulation in order to be able to base some other political moves in the future on it, such as the abolition of the Republika Srpska, compensatory measures, and further measures against Serbia”.¹³ Besides disputing the legal formulation of the crime in Srebrenica, the reciprocity in victimhood also serves as a mechanism of denial. However, Vučić and Nikolić are not the only ones using the same argumentation strategies; there are many other relevant statements from high-ranking state officials.¹⁴

The official denial pattern is perpetual in Serbian national and international politics, but it reached its peak this year with the adoption of the UN General Assembly resolution on the Srebrenica genocide. The pacifist and belated act of the UN made it clear that July 11th will be an “International Day of Reflection and Commemoration of the 1995 Genocide in Srebrenica.”¹⁵ The EU’s official stance on this matter is clear (the European Parliament passed a similar resolution in 2009 with a vast majority), but surprisingly, some EU countries acted in a diplomatically confusing (calculated) manner or fell under Serbia’s deplorable soft power strategies, either abstaining or voting against the convention.¹⁶ The strategy of opposing accountability was once again implemented by spreading a national campaign in Serbia and Republika Srpska, claiming that the “Convention” collectivizes guilt and labels Serbs as a genocidal nation.¹⁷ Accompanied by state-financed billboards in the big cities, the reaction of state officials was significant.¹⁸ Government representatives were even seen watching the live broadcast of the UN General Assembly vote, draped in the Serbian flag, with some wearing T-shirts bearing the slogan “we are not a genocidal people.”¹⁹ Despite this, the initial documents issued by the EU institutions still hold leverage, continuing to promote reconciliation and commemorate the victims with the same mnemonic setup.

Mnemonic Discrepancy Remains High

Analyzing the official discourse that creates the mnemonic image of the traumatic event in Srebrenica, it has become clear that the denial usually concentrates on disputing legal terms, emphasizing reciprocity in victimization, and collectivizing guilt. This consequently devalues the extent of the crime and questions accountability. Accordingly, Serbian memory politics creates a nationalistic, self-centred, and self-victimized perception of the event by also neglecting the victims of Srebrenica genocide.

However, the EU institutions are not silent about this denial. The EU sees this issue as a destabilizing factor in the region that is hindering the post-Yugoslav countries from reconciling. Therefore, EU officials and institutions must put effort into diplomatically incentivizing Serbia to stop denying the genocide in Srebrenica. The European Parliament Report on Serbia from 2018 stated that EU Parliament officials noticed the “reiterated denial of the Srebrenica genocide by some Serbian authorities.”²⁰ Furthermore, the EU explicitly stressed that “the recognition of the Srebrenica genocide is a fundamental step in Serbia’s path towards joining the EU.”²¹ This clause confirms that Serbia must harmonize its memory politics regarding the Srebrenica genocide with the EU’s, which is based on the decisions and rulings of the ICTY and ICJ.

Additionally, in almost all annual versions of the European Commission’s Report on Serbia, the problem of denial has been addressed.²² The form of addressing the issue has slightly changed from reminding Serbia to comply with the rulings from the ICJ and ICTY to noting that the denial comes from parliamentarians and those in power without repercussions.

While examining the memory Europeanization process in Serbia, we detected well-maintained mechanisms of denial that have hindered the country’s efforts to reconcile with its past.Serbian state officials still avoid acknowledging the genocide, endangering the regional reconciliation process and the country’s Europeanization (both normative and legal) process. While EU reactions indicate that Serbia must align with the EU memory framework, no conditionality pushes this compliance forward. Due to this lack of conditionality, the process of the Europeanization of memory in Serbia stagnates. As we can see based on the example of Srebrenica, the mnemonic discrepancy between Serbian official memory politics and the EU memory framework remains high.

About the author:
Nikola Gajić is a political scientist and Associate Researcher at the Leibniz Institute for East and Southeast European Studies/KonKoop project. He is pursuing a PhD in social anthropology at the University of Regensburg. His research focuses on memory politics, transitional justice, and nationalism studies. His current project explores the afterlife of ICTY victims’ testimonies.

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5. Ibid. [↩]
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12. Ibid. [↩]
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18. Miljuš, Stefan, and Rade Ranković; “Reakcije Na Rezoluciju o Srebrenici: Pobeda i Poraz Srbije Ili Vučićeva Bitka Da Odbrani Sopstvenu Političku Prošlost?” Glas Amerike, May 25, 2024. https://www.glasamerike.net/a/rezolucija-un-genocid-srebrenica-srbija-predsednik-aleksandar-vucic-devedesete/7625289.html. [↩]
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21. Ibid. [↩]
22. European Commission. Serbia 2013 Report. October 2013. https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2016-12/sr_rapport_2013.pdf.; European Commission. Serbia 2015 Report. November 2015. https://www.stat.gov.rs/media/2823/serbia-report-2015.pdf.; European Commission. Serbia 2019 Report. May 2019. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20190529-serbia-report.pdf.; European Commission. Serbia 2020 Report. October 2020. https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2020-10/serbia_report_2020.pdf.; European Commission. Serbia 2022 Report. October 2022. https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-10/Serbia%20Report%202022.pdf. [↩]

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